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1 Introduction 
This paper examines the relationship between country-governance and the size-effect in acquisitions. 
Prior literature shows that larger acquirers tend to earn lower acquisition-returns in strong-governance 
countries (Moeller et al., 2004). The argued reason for this finding is that large size can insulate managers 
from the market for corporate control, leading to managerial entrenchment and value-destruction. 
However, larger firms could experience several advantages in weaker governance markets. One view is 
that political connections and market power can be valuable sources of shareholder wealth in weak 
governance markets. This is largely due to weak governance countries having weak institutions and 
property rights, with key players, including politicians, wielding significant power without much 
accountability (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Such political connections are more likely to 
exist in large, powerful companies (Farina, 2002), who are better able to exploit these advantages to 
increase shareholder wealth. Another view, but one with similar valuation outcomes for shareholders, is 
that in weak governance countries, larger size serves to protect firms from possible expropriation and 
government corruption. Under this view, firms have incentives to increase in size over time as a means of 
adapting to their environment (Lucas, 1978; Granovetter, 1995; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Guiso and 
Rustichini, 2011).  
In well-governed and regulated markets, companies are better protected from sovereign rent-
seeking and expropriation, so larger size is likely to be less valuable in protecting shareholder wealth. 
Indeed, the economics and finance literature has generally focused on large size as a source of value 
destruction and agency conflicts in well-governed open economies (Baumol, 1962; Jensen, 1986). For 
example, in analyzing takeover returns, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) report average losses of 
$25 million for large acquiring firms in the USA over the period 1980-2001. Further, Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) show that a relatively small number of large firms account for takeover 
losses of over $240 billion during the period 1998-2001. The scale of the shareholder value-destruction 
through takeovers by large firms is interesting given that the USA is one of the most highly rated countries 
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on a range of governance metrics, including the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the World 
Bank (WB). One of the explanations given for such an effect is that in a strong governance country, such as 
the USA, firm size serves to entrench managers from external discipline from the market for corporate 
control (c.f. Offenberg, 2009). Noteworthy, however, is that while the losses experienced by large 
acquiring firms in the USA are well documented, there is a dearth of evidence on the comparative value-
implications of corporate size in an international context.  
This paper examines whether and why the acquirer size effect in acquisitions varies with the 
governance of the acquirer’s country. Our main empirical investigation begins with an examination of the 
relation between acquisition returns and the interaction of firm size with sovereign governance indices 
across our sample of 45 countries. We show that large acquiring firms tend to earn lower acquisition 
returns than do smaller acquiring firms, consistent with the presence of agency conflicts and managerial 
entrenchment. However, compared with large acquirers in strong governance countries, large acquirers in 
weak governance countries perform significantly better, even after controlling for a range of firm, 
industry, country, and time-specific factors. We hypothesize that this is because while large firms in weak 
governance countries may still suffer from agency conflicts related to managerial entrenchment, the 
benefits of large size in those countries may at least partially off-set agency-related costs.  
We next explore several of the value-drivers in large-firms’ acquisitions. We provide some 
evidence suggesting there are fewer barriers to completing takeovers by larger acquirers in weak 
governance countries: their deals take significantly less time to complete (controlling for other factors), 
than those of large acquirers in strong governance countries. Furthermore, whereas larger acquirers 
(compared to smaller) in stronger governance countries are more likely to be involved in costly hostile 
takeovers, we find that for weaker governance countries, larger size actually increases the likelihood of 
doing a friendly deal, which we know from our analysis, is significantly more value-enhancing. Our 
analysis of takeover premiums provides no evidence that the benefits of large size merely reflect 
expropriation from the target firm’s shareholders (as opposed to actual value-creation). Further, large 
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firms in weak governance markets do takeovers that are more likely to increase operating performance 
than are their counterparts in strong governance markets.  
We also provide some additional evidence to support the view that political connections are an 
important value driver for larger firms in weak governance countries. We use political connections data 
from Faccio (2006) to examine the importance of corporate size in countries where corporate-political 
connections appear to be especially prevalent. We find that the benefits of large size increase significantly 
with the importance of political connections in a given country, implying that larger firms’ deals might 
benefit from their connections, or at least their ability to navigate environments where connections and 
political issues are especially important. We also confirm this by examining sub-samples of deals (i.e. 
domestic deals and diversifying deals) where political connections are most likely to be important.  
The results contribute to the takeover and the corporate organization literature by shedding new 
light on the size-effect in acquisitions. We find evidence of a size-effect in acquirer returns that extends 
internationally, supporting the argument that agency and managerial entrenchment costs increase with 
firm size. However, large acquirers in weak governance countries perform significantly better (or at least 
less poorly) than do large acquirers in strong governance countries. This suggests that large firms in weak 
governance countries enjoy some advantages, which at least partially off-set the agency-cost implications 
of corporate size. We provide some evidence that political connections can help to off-set the agency-
related factors that are associated with large size. We also conduct a number of robustness tests, including 
using different definitions of firm size and measures of abnormal returns, and confirm that our results are 
robust to model specification issues. We also control for some other potential sources of heterogeneity 
that may explain our results, including controls for firm-level governance, and the quality of target 
country governance on takeover returns. We find that our results continue to hold in these robustness 
tests.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the prior literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and defines the variables. Section 4 contains the empirical 
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analysis of the impact acquirer size on acquisition performance. This section also discusses several 
robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Hypothesis development 
Takeovers are an event in which an acquirer might benefit from being a larger firm in a weak governance 
environment. Corporations in weak governance environments can generate value by extracting rents from 
the government (Fisman, 2001; Chen, 2013), and by exploiting their market power to extract rents from 
other market participants. Larger and ‘more powerful’ companies are usually more politically connected 
(Faccio et al., 2006) and have greater market power, allowing them to extract higher rents. Strong 
governance is one way to reduce rents from the government (Faccio, 2006) or from market power 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000). For several reasons, this would suggest that larger firms in weak governance 
environments enjoy several benefits that would at least partially off-set the agency-cost implications of 
corporate size.  
First, political connections can help facilitate merger approval in developing and transitioning 
economies (Zhiang et al., 2009; Zheng and Singh, 2010). Faccio (2010) finds that larger firms generally have 
more political connections. Thus, to the extent that large firms are more connected, large firms in weak-
governance environments could use political connections to facilitate the takeover process and obtain 
government approval. Similarly, social ties can help to facilitate deals in weak-governance countries (Ellis, 
2011), and such social networks become increasingly important as governance worsens (Roy and Oliver, 
2009). To the extent that larger firms are generally seen as more ‘prestigious’ and tend to attract 
managers who are more connected (see e.g. Masulis and Mobbs, 2012), large firms should be most able to 
leverage social ties.  
Second, political connections (which concentrate in large firms) can yield acquirer-benefiting 
takeovers because: (a) prestige, status and political power tend to induce a more positive target response 
(D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993), and this should be more important in weak-governance environments; and 
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(b) there is some evidence of forced takeovers in weak governance environments and these tend to 
benefit larger more connected firms (MacIntyre, 2003; Volkov, 2004).  
Third, given that business groups generate corporate value in weak-governance environments (He 
et al., 2013), large firms could use their dominant position as a form of non-pecuniary acquisition 
currency with which to entice target-firm shareholders (Khanna, 2000).  
Fourth, given that (a) lenders in weak governance requirements often require high levels of asset-
backed collateral (Menkhoff et al., 2006), and (b) large firms are more able to satisfy this requirement, 
large firms might be best able to finance takeovers. This advantage should concentrate in weak 
governance environments where collateral is more important. 
Fifth, large size is a protective mechanism that is ‘adapted’ to weak governance environments and is 
relatively less useful in good governance environments. For weak governance environments, 
organizations may increase in size as a way to protect themselves from government intervention and 
political instability (Granovetter, 1995; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). This is particularly important where the 
governance environment, weak contract law, and the lack of the rule of law may make external 
transactions risky (consistent with Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Yafeh, 
2007). Subsequently, there is some related evidence that resource-rich parties tend to perform better in 
litigation in emerging markets (He and Su, 2013). However, this ‘protection’ aspect of large size is mainly 
adapted to weak governance environments. Thus, it becomes less useful in strong governance 
environments, where large size may offer ‘excess’ protection from external market forces, and may enable 
managers to act on agency conflicts (Moeller et al., 2004, 2005; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011). 
Subsequently, the ‘excess’ protection from market forces in strong governance countries might destroy 
shareholder wealth. This suggests that while large size increases shareholder wealth by protecting firms 
in weak governance countries, in good governance countries it might destroy shareholder wealth by 
offering excess managerial protection and reducing managerial discipline. This background enables us to 
make the following ‘value-creation’ hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 1: Value-creation hypothesis. The market will react more positively (or at least less 
negatively) to deals made by large companies in weak governance countries as compared with those 
made in strong governance countries.  
 
We next consider several possible reasons for why the market might respond more favorably to large 
acquirers’ acquisitions. First, larger firms might be able to use their connections and resources to reduce 
the time required to complete a deal. Reducing completion times can be value-creating given that (a) 
acquisitions are often costly due to the presence of financial intermediaries (see e.g. Krishnan et al., 2012; 
Krishnan and Masulis, 2013), and (b) the longer a deal remains open the more scope there is for a 
competing bidder to place a bid, thereby increasing acquisition premiums and creating the risk of a 
winner’s curse (Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989; Boone and Mulherin, 2008). The ‘completion time’ hypothesis 
captures this prediction.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Completion-time hypothesis. In weak governance countries, larger firms take less 
time to complete a deal, compared to large in stronger governance countries.  
 
Second, larger acquirers in weak governance countries might be more able to undertake a ‘friendly’ deal 
than larger in strong governance countries. This might arise for several reasons, including political 
connections, increased market power, and greater financial resources. These factors might encourage a 
potential target to acquiesce to a deal rather than to compete with the bidder. Further, a larger firm might 
be more able to finance an adequate takeover premium, which would reduce the likelihood of deal-
resistance. Subsequently, we make the following ‘deal mood’ hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Deal-mood hypothesis. In weak governance countries, larger firms will be more 
likely to undertake a ‘friendly’ deal compared to larger firm in strong governance countries.  
8 
 
Third, it might be possible that larger firms’ acquisitions in weak governance countries (compared with 
those in strong governance countries) perform better because they are able to use their market-position 
to pay lower premiums and ‘expropriate’ wealth from the target’s shareholders. The simple fact of paying 
lower takeover premiums could result in the market responding more positively to large firms’ 
acquisitions in poor governance countries. We capture this with the ‘takeover premium’ hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Takeover premium hypothesis. Large firms in weak governance countries pay lower 
takeover premiums than do large firms in strong governance countries.  
 
We further anticipate that in weak governance countries, large firms will have some advantages over their 
counter parts in strong governance countries due to the utility of political connections. While political 
connections (and expenditures) are important in developed markets (Coates, 2012), they are significantly 
more important in comparatively weak governance markets (Chen et al., 2010; Brockman et al., 2013). 
Subsequently, in weak governance markets, we hypothesize that firm size is important in those types of 
deals where government intervention is more likely to be important. First, government connections are 
likely to be more important when the firm is undertaking a domestic takeover for another firm in the 
bidder’s country than it is for a cross-border deal. Second, government-intervention is likely to have the 
most adverse consequences for diversifying deals, as the government directs diversifying acquisitions 
which do not create shareholder wealth (Fan et al., 2008). Given that we expect that large firms in weak 
governance markets will be more able to resist such government intervention, we expect that they will 
perform comparatively better in these diversifying deals. We also examine the role of acquirer size in 
countries where political connections are more dominant in corporate boards, on average.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Connections hypothesis. In weak governance countries, larger size is helpful in those 
types of deals that are more likely to rely on connections (although, this does not mean that large size 
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is not important in other types of deals). The benefits of larger size should increase with the 
importance of political connections in the acquirer’s country.  
 
Improvements in operating performance (as opposed to simply obtaining a cheap target) can be a key 
source of value-creation. We expect that larger firms in weak governance countries will do takeovers that 
are more likely to increase long-run operating performance. A value-creating takeover should both be 
associated with a more positive market reaction and should increase operating performance (Li, 
Forthcoming; Healy et al., 1992; Powell and Stark, 2005; Harford et al., 2012). We expect that large firms 
in weak governance countries will be more likely to experience operating improvements than their 
counterparts in strong governance countries. This is because (from the foregoing discussion) while large 
firms in both weak governance and strong governance countries might suffer agency conflicts of 
managerial-entrenchment, large size conveys some additional wealth-enhancing benefits in weak 
governance countries. These benefits will at least partially off-set some of the agency costs related to large 
size. Examining operating performance also has the empirical benefit of helping to validate the short-run 
market-returns results with longer-run results. Subsequently, we make the following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Operating performance hypothesis. Large firms in weak governance countries are 
more likely to do takeovers that increase operating performance than are large firms in strong 
governance countries.  
 
3 Data 
The full sample comprises of 17,647 takeover observations from 45 countries. The takeover data is 
extracted from Thomson’s SDC platinum and we analyze takeovers announced between 1996 and 2008. 
The results are robust to excluding the financial crisis year 2008, and years associated with the Asian 
Financial Crisis. We obtain stock-return data from Datastream. Acquirer level financial data is extracted 
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from Worldscope. Governance data is taken from the World Bank’s governance indicators site and from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We restrict the sample to takeovers that are for at least USD 
1m, are completed, and for which the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target before the takeover and 
holds 100% of the target after (consistent with Masulis et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2012). Table A1 in 
Appendix 1 contains a detailed description of the variables and their calculation.  
 
3.1 Dependent variables  
We use the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the acquisition announcement as a 
proxy for whether the deal creates value. We use an 11-day market-adjusted CAR. We choose an 11-day 
window because some markets have weak stock exchange rules, giving rise to potential leakage and pre-
takeover informed trade, which a longer window will capture. Using alternative windows (e.g., 3-day, 5-
day, 21-day) does not alter our findings (untabulated). The market return is the return earned on the 
market index for the firm’s market as indicated in DataStream. We used a market-adjusted model over a 
market model because many of the deals in our sample occur in countries with fairly illiquid markets. This 
illiquidity could bias the estimation of market model parameters (Dimson, 1979; Dimson and Marsh, 1983). 
Nevertheless, in untabulated results, our findings are robust to using market model based CARs, where 
the model parameters (alpha and beta) are estimated using OLS regressions over 200 days (-210, -11) 
prior to the takeover announcement for each firm. We also use methods (untabulated) advocated by 
Dimson (1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977) to adjust the market model parameters for non-
synchronous trading, and find results consistent with our market-adjusted models. For brevity and 
reporting convenience, we only tabulate results using the market-adjusted model. 
We collect data from SDC on the time-to-completion and the deal mood in order to address 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. We measure the time to completion (the dependent variable) as the time 
between the announcement of the deal and the completion of the deal. We capture the deal mood by 
creating an indicator that equals one if the deal is ‘friendly’ (i.e. is not hostile, as reported in SDC).  
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We measure the takeover’s long run operating performance by obtaining data on the acquirer’s 
EBIT/Assets in the years after the acquisition (in order to address Hypothesis 6). We create indicators for 
whether the acquirer’s EBIT/Assets 1, 2, or 3 years after the takeover exceeds its EBIT/Assets 1-year 
before the takeover announcement (for three variables in total).  
 
3.2 Size and control variables 
The key independent variable is the acquirer firm size variable, defined as the natural log of the firm’s 
book assets, denoted ‘ln(Assets)’. Using the natural log of the firm’s market capitalization does not alter 
our findings. We also include a number of control variables that are standard to the literature (see, e.g., 
Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2012; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Moeller et al., 2004; 
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Moeller et al., 2005; Masulis et al., 2007; and Travlos, 1987). Specifically, 
we include relative size of the target, Tobin’s q, return on assets, capital expenditures, free cash flow, 
leverage, and indicator variables for diversifying deals, all cash, all stock, target organizational status (i.e., 
public, private or subsidiary), competed deals, and friendly deals. We also control for country-level 
characteristics to ensure that sovereign governance does not merely proxy for country-level growth 
characteristics. We include the market capitalization of the home market scaled by GDP (at the end of the 
prior year), the stock turnover ratio in the home market over the course of the prior year, and the amount 
of FDI, unemployment, and the trade imbalance in the prior year. The country-level variables are sourced 
from the World Bank.   
 
3.3 Governance variables 
We use governance variables that capture government-based expropriation and corruption. Note that we 
do not focus on shareholder protection. This is because we analyze the use of corporate size as a 
mechanism of protection from the government. Measures of shareholder protection would not capture 
this type of government corruption.  
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We use World Bank governance variables, which capture different types of government corruption 
and risk, and have also received extensive use in the literature (Neumayer, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; 
Apodaca, 2004; Braun and Di Tella, 2004; Thomas, 2010). We focus on these measures of country 
governance because they reflect varying types of corruption, government effectiveness, and the rule of 
law. We do not focus on the ADRI indices (cf La Porta et al., 1997; Spamann, 2010) because they only 
capture shareholder protection, and do not capture government expropriation, which is the focus of this 
study. They are also time invariant, so will not capture changes due to financial liberalization. By contrast, 
the World Bank variables are available in most years.1 
The first governance variable is the World Bank governance variable. The World Bank variable is 
based on six World Bank sub-variables. The six World Bank variables are percentile ranks in terms of 
accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, regulation, the rule of law, and corruption. We 
compute a composite governance index (WB governance index), which is the equally weighted average of 
these six percentile ranks. We also use the ICRG political risk index. These variables capture (weak) 
sovereign risk. In all cases, a higher governance score indicates stronger governance.  
 
3.4 Political connections measures 
We obtain the political connections measures from Faccio (2006), as indicated above. We focus on the 
level of political connections at the aggregate country level. We do this for two reasons. First, it allows us 
to use the data in Faccio (2006) for the full time-period under-analysis. If we were to use the firm-specific 
data in Faccio (2006), then we would be limited to the set of firms that existed at the time of the study. 
Second, using sovereign-level data allows us to avoid concerns about endogeneity between corporate size 
and political connections.  
We use three proxies for the importance of political connections in the acquirer’s country. First, we 
use the percentage of all firms that had as one of their top officers a member of parliament or head of 
                                                     
1
 The World Bank provides figures for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. For the 
years with missing data we use the figure from the most recent prior year. 
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state. Second, we use the percentage of all firms who satisfy the first definition, or had a top officer who 
was a close relative of a member of parliament or head of state. Third, we use the percentage of the top 50 
firms (by market capitalization) who have a top officer who is either a member of parliament or a head or 
state, or is a close relative thereof. The percentages are based on the sample of all Worldscope firms.  
 
3.5 Univariate analysis and sample description 
The sample composition by year is reported in Table 1. The summary statistics for the variables are 
reported in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level by country. We report CARs 
and $CARs using both the market-adjusted model (MAM) and the market-model (MM). The positive 
average CARs of 1.31% (MAM) or 1.92% (MM) reported in Table 1 are consistent with prior studies and 
suggest that acquiring firms, on average, gain from takeovers. The higher mean CARs for the MM confirm 
our illiquidity concerns with respect to some of the less well-developed economies in our sample. More 
specifically, in markets that suffer from illiquidity problems, stocks may not trade on a daily basis, so beta 
estimates from a market model will be biased downwards (Dimson, 1979; Dimson and Marsh, 1983), 
giving rise to lower expected returns, and higher abnormal returns. Nevertheless, both MAM and MM 
CARs are positive and statistically significant. However, we find differences in the sign for $CARs, with 
negative average values ($1.65m) for MAM returns, and positive ($0.40m) for the MM returns. Given our 
concerns about illiquidity, we place more confidence on the MAM values, so on the basis of the negative 
$CAR, we conclude that our results confirm the existence of a size-effect across our sample. Table 1 also 
shows some variation in takeover activity over time, with higher activity and clustering during the late 
1990s, and again during the 2004-2007 period (Ahern and Harford, Forthcoming; as per Andrade et al., 
2001; Powell and Yawson, 2005). The statistics show the existence of some large dollar losses in 
takeovers during the 2000 and 2001 period, which overlaps with the time period of large losses as 
reported by Moeller et al. (2005) for the USA market. However, as we will see later, large losses are not 
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solely driven by the USA market. To control for unobserved year effects, we use year dummies in our 
regression models. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our multivariate regression models. The 
WB composite index and the ICRG political index (Panel A) have mean values of 0.89 and 0.84 
respectively, indicating that on average, governance levels are fairly high. Some variation is evident, 
however, with reported standard deviations of 0.08 and 0.05, respectively. Other acquirer and deal 
characteristics are fairly consistent with prior studies, except that given the nature of our sample we 
report a much higher proportion of cross-border deals at 26% and diversifying deals at 67%.  
Table 3 reports the CARs and governance-indexes by country. The CARs are based on a market 
adjusted approach (MAM). The table shows that there is significant variation in CARs across countries, 
largely varying with the quality of the governance in that country. There is significant variation in 
country-level governance. The components of the World Bank governance index largely move together, 
suggesting a high level of correlation between the different aspects of governance.  
We compare the CARs accruing to large firms in good governance countries with large firms in weak 
governance countries in Table 4. In Table 4, we split the sample into terciles, quartiles, and quintiles in 
terms of the firm’s assets and the World Bank governance score for the firm’s country. We report the 
mean and median CAR and the number of observations for each group. The CARs are the 11-day market-
adjusted CARs. We split the sample into acquirer-size groups and within each group look at the CARs in 
each governance sub-group. For example, within asset tercile 3 (i.e. the top 33% of acquirers in terms of 
size), we analyze CARs for each of the governance terciles. We present the difference-in-CARs between the 
worst governance group and the best governance group. There are two key findings. First, large acquirers 
tend to perform worse than do small acquirers. This is consistent across governance-groups. Thus, we find 
evidence of a size-effect internationally. Second, for the large acquirers (i.e. top tercile, quartile, or 
quintile), firms in weaker governance countries earn higher CARs than do firms in stronger governance 
countries. That is, the size effect is less pronounced. Overall, this indicates that while the size effect exists 
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outside of the USA, large acquirers perform comparatively less poorly in weak governance countries. This 
suggests that large size could convey benefits in weak governance countries that at least partially off-set 
the agency-related disbenefits of large acquirer size.  
 
4 Results and analysis 
4.1 Size, governance and CARs (Hypothesis 1) 
The goal is to examine how sovereign governance moderates the impact of firm size on takeover 
profitability. The expectation is that larger firms perform better in weak governance countries. We 
capture this expectation in the following model.  
        
( )   (      )   
( )      
( )(  (      )      )             (1) 
We expect that  ( ) will be negative, implying that larger acquirers in strong governance countries 
generally do worse deals. We also examine models where we create dummy variables for whether the 
acquirer is a ‘large’ firm, and whether it is in a ‘weak’ governance country. Specifically, we create three 
larger size dummy variables, which take the value of one in each case if the acquirer assets (US$) are in 
the top 50th, 25th, or 10th percentile of all firms, and zero otherwise. To capture weak governance, we 
create a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer’s country-level governance index is below the 
median value across all countries. The model specification is as follows.  
        
( )                      
( )              
  ( )(                                   )           
  (2) 
Where the variables are defined as above, with the exception that the model focuses on dummy variables. 
Here, we expect that  ( ) will be positive, implying that larger acquirers in weak governance countries 
generally do better deals. We estimate the models in Equations (1) and (2) by using OLS regressions that 
include year dummies and cluster standard errors by four-digit SIC industry (following Petersen, 2009). 
Table 5 reports OLS regressions based on equations 1 (columns 1-4) and 2 (columns 5-8). Columns 
1 and 2 show no significant relationship between CARs and firm size. This is not surprising given that 
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Tables 3 shows significant variations in acquirer returns across size/governance portfolios, suggesting 
that sovereign-heterogeneity might influence the size/CARs relationship. Columns 3 and 4 include the 
interaction terms ‘ln(Assets) x WB Gov.’ and ‘ln(Assets) x ICRG Political Index’. The negative and 
significant coefficients on the interaction terms indicate that sovereign governance negatively moderates 
the impact of corporate size on takeover returns. When combined with the positive coefficient on 
ln(Assets), this suggests that while large size can convey some benefits in weak governance markets (in 
the form of connections and market power) these traits are less useful in stronger governance markets. 
We obtain similar results in Columns 5-8, which contain dummy-variable regressions as in Equation 2. 
The interaction term, which now captures the returns to large acquirers in weak governance countries, is 
positive and statistically significant for all definitions of ‘large’ (i.e., top 25th, 10th percentiles), confirming 
that large acquirers takeovers in weak governance are, on average, value creating. Thus, in stronger 
governance markets, firm size can induce agency conflicts of managerial entrenchment, which mitigate 
any benefits the firm might otherwise gain from its size.   
The other control variables representing acquirer and deal characteristics generally have signs 
consistent with the literature. Relative size is positive and significant indicating that scale increases 
returns to the average deal, which is, on average, value-enhancing for acquirer shareholders, as reported 
in Table 2. Acquirers with higher leverage earn lower returns, consistent with higher financial risk. 
Tender offers, which may capture deal hostility, generate higher returns consistent with the disciplinary 
motive for takeovers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 1986; Scharfstein, 1988). Stock swap deals 
generate lower returns, which is consistent with overvaluation and information asymmetry motives as 
reported in prior studies (Travlos, 1987). Targeting both public and private targets appears to reduce 
returns relative to subsidiary targets, however, the larger negative coefficient on public is consistent with 
larger losses in targeting publicly listed targets (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002). Substituting the public 
dummy variable for a subsidiary dummy (untabulated) confirms that both private and subsidiary deals 
earn significantly greater returns than public. The coefficient on the private dummy variable is marginally 
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smaller, confirming that subsidiary deals earn the highest returns. The positive coefficient on ROA is 
consistent with the idea that higher quality managers tend to induce higher ROA, and higher quality 
managers may select more appropriate targets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
The results provide some initial support for our first hypothesis, that larger acquirer takeovers in 
weak governance countries create greater value for acquirer shareholders. 
 
4.2 Takeover approval and completion times (Hypothesis 2) 
The next set of models examine whether larger firms in weak governance markets complete deals more 
quickly. We use a similar regression specification to (1) and (2) above. Hypothesis 2 examines whether 
larger firms in weak governance markets complete deals more quickly. We measure the time to 
completion (the dependent variable) as the time between the announcement of the deal and the 
completion of the deal. Table 6 reports OLS regressions that examine the impact of acquirer size and 
country governance on deal completion times. The results are also robust if we use a tobit specification 
instead of OLS (untabulated). Columns 1 and 2 use continuous size and governance variables. Columns 3-6 
use size and governance dummy variables. The results in Columns 1 and 2 indicate that in stronger 
governance countries, larger companies take longer to complete deals than their smaller counterparts, 
suggesting that large companies face greater regulatory barriers in stronger governance countries. 
Conversely, the coefficients on the interaction terms (i.e. ‘Weak WB Gov. x Size Top 10%’ and ‘Weak 
Political Gov. x Size Top 10%’) in Columns 3-6 highlight that in weak governance markets, larger 
companies take significantly less time to complete deals.2 The statistically stronger results for the largest 
firms in our sample are consistent with our hypothesis that political connections will be concentrated in 
the largest firms.  
 
                                                     
2
 While the coefficients on the governance variables are negative and large in magnitude, this does not imply that the 
deal takes a ‘negative’ period to complete; instead, the similarly large constant term and the presence of interaction 
variables, suggests that deals have a positive time-to-completion. 
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4.3 Deal mood (Hypothesis 3) 
Another mechanism whereby political connections can manifest in the takeover process is in the mood of 
the takeover. Hypothesis 3 predicts that stronger political connections may facilitate more friendly deals, 
which are likely to be less expensive for the acquirer. For these regression models, the dependent variable 
is a dummy indicator that equals one if the deal is ‘friendly’ in nature (i.e., target management recommend 
bid acceptance) and equals zero otherwise. The models are estimated using logit regressions. 
Table 7 examines this further by testing whether larger firms in weak governance countries are 
significantly more likely to undertake friendly deals. The results are consistent with expectations. The 
interaction term in Columns 1 and 2 indicates that large firms in stronger governance countries are less 
likely to do friendly deals. Conversely, the interaction term in Columns 3-6 indicates that larger acquirers 
in weak governance countries are significantly more likely to do friendly deals than are larger acquirers in 
strong governance countries (or smaller acquirers in weak governance countries). We interpret this as 
evidence that political connections help facilitate friendly deals, which in part explain the larger returns 
earned by large acquirers in weak governance countries.  
 
4.4 ‘Expropriation’ from the target’s shareholders (Hypothesis 4) 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that one avenue in which acquirers can create value for their own 
shareholders is by ‘expropriating’ wealth from the target’s shareholders by paying a low acquisition 
premium. We test this by calculating the takeover premiums that firms pay in acquisitions of listed targets 
(we cannot obtain data for unlisted targets because there is no pre-acquisition market value for these 
targets). The dependent variable is measured as the transaction value scaled by the target’s market value 
one week or four weeks before the takeover. This is a relatively standard way to compute takeover 
premiums (Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Harford et al., 2012; Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
We report models that examine takeover premiums in Table 8. The negative and significant 
coefficient on the interaction terms suggests that larger acquiring firms in strong governance countries 
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pay lower premiums, on average, than do smaller firms. The negative, but insignificant firm size 
coefficients indicate that premiums, on average, do not differ significantly between large and small 
acquirers in weak governance countries. This is opposite to our prediction for hypothesis 4, and suggests 
that the size/governance effect does not merely reflect large acquirers in weak governance countries 
expropriating value from target firm shareholders. The inferences are unchanged when we use the size 
dummy variable specification as denoted by equation 2 (untabulated).  
 
 
Government connections (Hypothesis 5) 
This section examines in more detail the linkages between larger acquirers in weak governance countries 
and political connections.  
First, we examine whether large acquirers in weak governance countries perform better than large 
acquirers in strong governance countries in the types of deals for which connections might be more 
important. Specifically, we explore whether the large firms’ benefits accrue in domestic deals and 
diversifying deals (Table 9). We anticipate that larger firms’ advantages will especially manifest in 
domestic deals because these deals are more likely to benefit from large firms’ hypothesized political 
connections. Further, given that (a) government-mandated deals and government intervention can induce 
value-destroying diversification (Fan et al., 2008), and (b) we expect large firms to be more able to resist such 
government-directed deals, we anticipate that large firms in weak governance markets will do better in 
diversifying deals than will small firms. The models in Table 9 estimate the CARs regressions (Equations 1 and 
2) for sub-samples of domestic deals and diversifying deals. The results are largely consistent with expectations. 
Panel A uses continuous size and governance variables and Panels B-C use size and governance dummy 
variables. The results indicate that large firms perform better (worse) in weak (strong) governance markets in 
domestic deals and in diversifying deals. This implies that large firms are more able to use their connections to 
both pursue domestic deals and resist value-destroying diversification.  
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The second set of models uses the country-level measures of the importance of connections. We 
expect that larger firms will perform better in countries where political connections are more important. 
We use the data on aggregate country-level political connections from Faccio (2006) to examine the 
importance of corporate size in countries where political connections appear to be especially important. 
Faccio (2006) collects data on corporate political connections in 47 countries. The data pertains to the 
period of 1997 to 2001. Faccio (2006) provides aggregate country-level data on the percentage of firms 
who have a member of parliament, head of state, or close relative thereof as a top officer. We use these 
country-level variables to analyze the importance of size in countries where connections appear to be 
especially prominent and important. We focus on country-level variables because (a) they allow us to get 
an overall picture of the importance of connections in the acquirer’s country, (b) they allow us to retain 
our full time-period (as opposed to just looking at the point in time underlying the Faccio (2006) dataset, 
and (c) they obviate concerns over endogeneity between the firm’s specific level of connections and its 
size. This dataset has received significant use in the literature (Faccio, 2006, 2010). We exclude from the 
sample firms that are listed in the United Kingdom because the UK presents a significant outlier in the 
Faccio (2006) dataset. Specifically, Faccio (2006) reports that 46% of the top 50 UK firms have political 
connections. It is not economically sensible that nepotism-through-connections would be so widespread 
in a country that otherwise scores highly in all metrics of sovereign governance. We estimate the 
following model.  
        
( )   (      )   
( )                          
  ( )(  (      )                            )           
   (3) 
Where,                            denotes one of the three key measures of the average level of political 
connections in the acquirer’s country. The measures are the percentage of all firms in the acquirer’s 
country who have as one of their top officers or large shareholders either (a) a member of parliament or 
head of state, or is (b) closely related to a member of parliament or head of state. We also examine the 
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percentage of the top 50 firms in the country who have as a top officer a member of parliament/head of 
state or a close relative of such.  
 We report these models in Table 10. As indicated above, we exclude acquirers in the United 
Kingdom from the sample given that they represent an outlier in the Faccio (2006) dataset. The main 
finding is that the coefficient on the interaction term is significant and positive, suggesting that the 
benefits of corporate size increase with the importance of political connections in a country.  
 
4.5 Operating performance (Hypothesis 6)  
We expect that large firms in weak governance markets will do takeovers that yield greater 
improvements in operating performance (hypothesis 6). We capture this by creating indicators for 
whether the acquirer’s EBIT/Assets 1, 2, or 3 years after the takeover exceeds its EBIT/Assets 1-year 
before the takeover announcement (for three variables in total). We estimate these models using logit 
regressions. 
The results reported in Table 11 indicate that in weak governance markets, large firms’ acquisitions 
are more likely to increase operating performance. The coefficient on ‘ln(Assets)’ is positive and 
statistically insignificant, implying that firm size does not per-se significantly increase the likelihood of 
operating performance improvements. The coefficients on the governance variables, ‘WB Gov Index’ and 
‘ICRG Political Index’ are positive (in all but one case) and sometimes statistically significant, suggesting 
that takeovers, on average, tend to perform better when they are conducted by acquirers in a strong-
governance market. The negative, and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction terms implies 
that large firms perform comparatively worse in strong governance markets than they do in weak 
governance markets.  
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4.6 Additional robustness tests 
In this section we report the findings of some additional tests that further test the robustness of our 
findings to alternative firm size definitions, and to other sources of heterogeneity that might explain why 
larger firms perform better (worse) in weak (strong) governed countries. Due to the large number of 
additional tests conducted, we do not tabulate them for reporting convenience. They are, however 
available from the authors on request. 
 
Measuring firm size: We measure firm size as a continuous variable, and by using size dummy variables. 
Both measures do not take into account relative size differences across countries. Nevertheless, we repeat 
our analysis using size measures that capture the relative size within each country. Specifically, for each 
country, we define large dummy variables by allocating acquiring firms to the top 25th and 10th percentiles 
in assets of local currency. Our results remain unchanged.   
 
Firm-level governance: Firm-level governance quality could be argued as a potential source of 
heterogeneity between firms that may not be captured by our country-level governance variables. Given 
the scant availability of corporate governance measures (e.g., board and ownership data, shareholder 
rights indices) for most of the countries in our sample, we develop a proxy measured as the absolute level 
of discretionary accruals. The level of discretionary accruals is argued to reflect the quality of earnings 
and the earnings management (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). The idea 
here is that earnings management is more likely to occur in weakly governed firms, possibly due to weak 
oversight by the board, and/or weak internal control and audit systems (Beasley, 1996; Becker et al., 
1998; Chtourou et al., 2001). We measure discretionary accruals using the modified Jones (1991) 
approach. We do not use accruals-variables in the reported models because even requiring data on 
discretionary accruals significantly reduces the sample size (to 11,349 observations). Including the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals to total accruals in our models does not alter our conclusions.  
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Target country governance: We also examine whether the sovereign governance in the target’s country 
influences acquirer takeover returns. Target-country governance is incrementally relevant only if the deal 
is cross-border (for a domestic takeover, the target and acquirer have the same governance). Thus, we 
constrain our sample to include only these takeovers. The results indicate that target country governance 
has no significant impact on acquirer profitability.  
 
Country-effects: The results are not riven by observations deriving from any one country. The results are 
robust to omitting observations from the USA (which account for a large portion of the sample). We also 
find similar results to Moeller et al (2004) if we restrict the sample to contain only companies from the 
USA. Further, we also employ a weighted least squares (WLS) specification that down-weights 
acquisitions made by acquirers in countries that feature many observations (specifically, weighting each 
observation by the inverse of the proportion of deals (in dollar terms) that come from the acquirer’s 
country). The WLS approach is probably preferable to simply omitting observations from particular 
countries. For example, if we omit the USA, then the UK, Australia and Canada comprise two-thirds of the 
remaining sample. The results for the WLS models are consistent with the reported regression results. 
The results are also qualitatively robust to including acquirer and/or target country-fixed effects.  
 
Alternative governance and omitted variables: The results are robust to using different measures of 
sovereign governance. We focus on the variables that are most associated with political risk and that have 
the potential to vary over time as countries develop. Nonetheless, the results are qualitatively similar if we 
use measures such as the anti-director rights index (as per La Porta et al., 1997), or the anti-self-dealing 
index (as per Djankov et al., 2008). Further, the results are robust to whether we use the original index or 
the updated version from Spamann (2010). The robustness across governance variables likely reflects the 
high degree of correlation amongst measures of sovereign governance.  
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We also examine whether omitted variable bias poses a problem for our models. One variable that is 
absent from our models is a direct measure of market power. While our models include industry 
dummies, which should capture some of the effects of greater market power, we nevertheless re-estimate 
the models including the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and find that our findings remain largely 
unchanged. The HHI term is positively related to acquirer CARs, consistent with the idea that market-
power-motivated acquisitions can improve acquirer-value.  
 
The results are also robust to controlling for the amount of M&A activity in the acquirer’s country. We do 
this to control for the likelihood that the market for corporate control is less competitive in weak 
governance countries. We find that while the level of M&A activity is negatively related to acquirer CARs, 
the results are qualitatively the same as those reported in the paper.    
 
Government ownership and sovereign wealth fund involvement: One concern is that the results 
might merely reflect government owned institutions making connected deals. However, only 91 acquirers 
have government or sovereign wealth fund ownership, and the results are qualitatively similarly if we 
omit these 91 deals.  
 
Relative deal size: Alexandridis et al (2013) argue that the deal size (relative to that of the acquirer) can 
significantly influence acquirer returns and can at least partially explain the size effect in acquisitions. We 
mitigate this concern by controlling for relative deal size in the reported results. In addition, in 
untabulated robustness tests, we split the sample into the top 50% and bottom 50% in terms of relative 
deal size. We find similar results to the reported results in both the high relative-deal-size and low 
relative-deal-size subsamples, suggesting that relative-deal-size does not drive our results.   
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5.  Conclusion  
This study examines the relationship between the acquirer size effect and sovereign governance. Prior 
literature from developed markets has generally focused on firm size as a source of agency conflicts and 
value destruction. However, large size could provide some off-setting benefits in weak governance 
environments. These benefits might derive from political connections and market power. They might also 
derive from larger size offering some protection from regimes that are affected by corruption at the 
government level.  
We show that in weak governance markets, large firms’ acquisitions earn significantly higher 
announcement returns, and are more likely to increase operating performance than they are in strong 
governance markets. We provide some evidence on the sources of these gains, including some evidence 
that larger firms in weak governance markets (compared with those in strong governance countries) tend 
to complete deals faster and tend to be more likely to do friendly deals. We also find evidence suggesting 
that at least part of the benefits of large size result from political connections. We take steps to ensure the 
results are robust to potential alternative explanations and model specification issues.  
The results also help to explain why large acquirers earn lower takeover returns in strong 
governance environments, where size may give rise to potential entrenchment problems and agency 
conflicts. In these environments, regulatory strength effaces the political and protective benefit of being a 
large firm. This means that large size is relatively less useful as a protective mechanism in these markets. 
Thus, large size begins to reduce shareholder wealth due to possible agency and other conflicts.  
The results also provide useful avenues for future research. Future studies could analyze other 
corporate and macroeconomic factors that moderate the size-effect in acquisitions. Additional research 
could also extend the analysis in Offenberg (2009) to examine the extent to which corporate size 
entrenches managers in weaker governance markets, potentially providing another explanation for the 
weaker-size effect documented in this study. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Bidder characteristics 
CARs 11-day cumulative abnormal returns (%), calculated using the market 
model, and the market-adjusted model. The paper estimates market model 
parameters over days (-210,-11) using an OLS model. We obtain the 
financial data from Datastream. 
Firm size measures Log of total assets; Log of market value (number of shares outstanding x 
price 11 days prior to announcement) 
Leverage Book value of debt scaled by total assets  
Tobin’s q Market value of assets scaled by book value of assets. The market value of 
assets is the firm’s market capitalization plus its book assets less its book 
equity.  
CAPEX The firm’s capital expenditure (CAPEX) scaled by its sales 
Return on assets The return on assets is the firm’s operating income scaled by its book 
assets.  
Cash-holdings The firm’s cash holdings scaled by its book assets.  
 
Deal characteristics 
Public target Dummy: 1 for public targets, 0 otherwise 
Private target Dummy: 1 for private targets, 0 otherwise 
Cash only Dummy: 1 for deals financed with cash only, 0 otherwise 
Stock only Dummy: 1 for deals financed with stock only, 0 otherwise 
Diversifying Dummy: 1 where bidder and target are in a different Fama-French 
industry, 0 otherwise  
Relative size Transaction value over bidder’s market capitalization 11 days before the 
announcement date.  
Friendly Dummy: 1 for deals recommended by target management, 0 otherwise 
Competed Dummy: 1 for competed deals, 0 otherwise  
Tender offer Dummy: 1 for tender offer deals, 0 otherwise 
Cross-border Dummy: 1 for cross-border deals 
Approval (days to completion) Number of days from the takeover announcement date to the takeover 
completion date 
Takeover premium  Transaction value scaled by the target’s market value 1 or 4 weeks prior to 
takeover announcement minus 1 
  
Country governance-type characteristics  
% Firms with MP/HOS or 
relative thereof 
The percentage of firms in the country that have a member-of-
parliament/politician or a head-of-state (or a relative thereof) on their 
board. The data is from Faccio (2006). 
% Firms with MP/HOS The percentage of firms in the country that have a member-of-
parliament/politician or a head-of-state on their board. The data is from 
Faccio (2006). 
% Top 50 Firms with MP/HOS 
or relative thereof 
The percentage of the top 50 firms in the country that have a member-of-
parliament/politician or a head-of-state on their board. The data is from 
Faccio (2006). 
ICRG Political Index The ICRG political risk index. The original index goes from 0 to 20. We 
normalize the index to range from 0 to 1. A higher score indicates better 
governance. 
WB Gov Index The World Bank governance index is based on six World Bank governance 
sub-variables. The six World Bank variables are percentile ranks in terms 
of accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, regulation, 
the rule of law, and corruption. We compute a composite governance index 
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(WB governance index), which is the equally weighted average of these six 
percentile ranks. The governance index ranges from 0 to 1 with a higher 
score representing better governance. 
  
Country characteristics (sourced from the World Bank) 
Home market capitalization (%) Market capitalization of listed companies/GDP 
Home stock turnover (%) Total value of shares traded/Average market capitalization 
FDI (%) Net inflows of investment / GDP 
Unemployment (%) % of labor force without work 
Trade Imbalance (imports – exports)/(imports + exports) 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics by year 
This table reports mean sample statistics by year. The term %CAR is the 11-day CAR in percentage 
terms, measured from 5 days before the takeover announcement date to 5 days after. MAM and MM 
denote abnormal returns calculated using a market-adjusted model and a market model, 
respectively. The variable $CAR is the 11-day dollar car inflated to US$m 2009. Market 
capitalization and assets inflated to US$ 2009, and are reported in millions.  
Year 
No. 
Observations 
%CAR 
MAM 
%CAR 
MM 
$CAR 
MAM 
$CAR 
MM 
Market 
Capitalization Assets 
1996 1,023 1.757 1.895 13.287 12.934 2,014 1,566 
1997 1,517 1.417 1.444 -6.142 -4.688 3,028 1,820 
1998 1,879 1.140 1.582 6.068 5.489 3,184 2,180 
1999 1,462 1.264 1.441 2.517 -3.380 9,322 3,552 
2000 1,568 0.254 1.301 -51.301 -48.040 11,869 3,671 
2001 915 -0.094 1.786 -18.106 -21.452 7,801 2,702 
2002 963 0.201 1.963 1.660 22.257 2,789 2,209 
2003 984 2.063 2.821 -5.909 5.858 4,121 2,413 
2004 1,359 1.807 2.073 -9.443 -6.619 12,987 2,391 
2005 1,556 2.080 2.152 10.136 7.768 4,935 3,498 
2006 1,630 1.927 2.215 -0.971 -2.267 4,216 3,272 
2007 1,672 1.747 2.546 20.309 23.297 4,293 3,724 
2008 1,119 0.737 2.103 -7.643 -3.738 3,329 2,665 
Total 17,647 1.306 1.923 -1.647 0.395 5,647 2,812 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for model variables 
The table reports summary statistics for CARs, governance, acquirer, deal, and country-level characteristics 
for the pooled sample.  Detailed variable definitions are reported in appendix 1 (Table A1). 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Obs. 
Panel A: Governance indices 
    WB Governance index 0.888 0.909 0.082 17,647 
ICRG Political index 0.844 0.855 0.050 17,459 
Panel B: Acquirer financial and deal characteristics 
  %CAR (Market-adjusted model, MAM) 1.306 0.778 8.228 17,647 
%CAR (Market model, MM) 1.923 0.895 7.949 17,647 
$CAR (MAM, US$m, 2009) -1.647 1.265 296.713 14,582 
$CAR (MM, US$m, 2009)) 0.395 1.435 287.772 14,582 
Market capitalization (US$m, 2009) 5,647 478 95,828 14,582 
Assets (US$m, 2009) 2,812 441 11,670 17,647 
Relative size 0.238 0.083 0.457 17,647 
Return on assets 0.082 0.110 0.180 17,647 
Leverage (market) 0.175 0.134 0.168 17,647 
Cash-holdings 0.145 0.075 0.174 17,647 
CAPEX 0.065 0.038 0.082 17,647 
Diversifying deal 0.672 1 0.470 17,647 
Competed 0.008 0 0.086 17,647 
Tender offer 0.044 0 0.205 17,647 
Friendly 0.985 1 0.123 17,647 
Cross-border 0.259 0 0.438 17,647 
Cash only 0.260 0 0.439 17,647 
Stock only 0.140 0 0.347 17,647 
Mixed 0.600 1 0.490 17,647 
Public 0.126 0 0.332 17,647 
Private 0.528 1 0.499 17,647 
Subsidiary 
Days to completion 
0.346 
52.54 
0 
27 
0.476 
75.37 
17,647 
17,646 
Panel C: Country-level financial characteristics 
  Home market capitalization (%) 1.309 1.371 0.444 17,647 
Home stock turnover (%) 106.213 103.200 47.223 17,647 
FDI (%) 0.028 0.020 0.049 17,647 
Unemployment (%) 5.656 5.200 2.011 17,647 
Trade Imbalance 5.271 5.477 8.773 17,647 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics for CARs and country-governance by country 
 
Acq. Nation Obs. CAR WB Gov 
Accountability 
WB Gov 
Anti- 
corruption 
WB Gov 
Effectiveness 
WB Gov 
Political 
Stability 
WB Gov 
Regulation 
WB Gov 
Rule of 
Law 
WB 
Gov 
Index 
ICRG 
Political 
Index 
Argentina 6 2.734 0.575 0.424 0.530 0.486 0.236 0.387 0.439 0.697 
Australia 1405 3.393 0.943 0.948 0.956 0.820 0.956 0.954 0.929 0.872 
Austria 28 0.832 0.923 0.947 0.932 0.881 0.939 0.970 0.932 0.866 
Belgium 57 2.353 0.935 0.909 0.925 0.766 0.899 0.904 0.890 0.832 
Brazil 67 0.158 0.605 0.559 0.532 0.390 0.558 0.450 0.516 0.662 
Canada 1216 -1.546 0.959 0.947 0.961 0.856 0.931 0.952 0.934 0.867 
Chile 10 4.113 0.805 0.888 0.869 0.732 0.910 0.865 0.845 0.780 
China 91 4.743 0.057 0.376 0.608 0.342 0.444 0.436 0.377 0.686 
Colombia 1 -3.727 0.394 0.539 0.536 0.048 0.546 0.305 0.395 0.580 
Denmark 61 3.650 0.986 0.986 0.990 0.843 0.980 0.987 0.962 0.871 
Finland 115 1.399 0.988 0.998 0.981 0.988 0.975 0.984 0.986 0.934 
France 269 1.789 0.887 0.906 0.900 0.683 0.838 0.899 0.852 0.782 
Germany 165 0.380 0.928 0.940 0.931 0.851 0.924 0.936 0.918 . 
Greece 11 2.564 0.766 0.648 0.721 0.621 0.756 0.729 0.707 0.767 
Hong Kong 165 1.418 0.584 0.906 0.908 0.821 0.981 0.874 0.846 0.790 
Hungary 1 -4.462 0.875 0.718 0.754 0.764 0.844 0.733 0.781 0.815 
Iceland 8 0.214 0.976 0.996 0.989 1.000 0.957 1.000 0.986 0.905 
India 37 0.466 0.608 0.451 0.517 0.228 0.442 0.584 0.472 0.616 
Indonesia 5 9.585 0.430 0.266 0.439 0.133 0.396 0.269 0.322 0.576 
Ireland-Rep 138 0.496 0.929 0.920 0.918 0.908 0.971 0.930 0.929 0.893 
Israel 61 1.284 0.682 0.820 0.839 0.131 0.806 0.772 0.675 0.628 
Italy 93 1.687 0.799 0.690 0.735 0.636 0.776 0.683 0.720 0.788 
Japan 597 1.853 0.779 0.860 0.875 0.847 0.812 0.892 0.844 0.826 
Jersey 1 -18.279 0.928 0.937 0.943 0.673 0.981 0.924 0.898 0.830 
Luxembourg 3 3.439 0.960 0.940 0.946 0.989 0.987 0.970 0.965 0.930 
Malaysia 188 1.251 0.373 0.661 0.801 0.561 0.666 0.643 0.618 0.733 
Mexico 25 0.298 0.528 0.474 0.615 0.351 0.641 0.401 0.502 0.723 
Netherlands 125 1.395 0.985 0.972 0.970 0.867 0.977 0.948 0.953 0.887 
New Zealand 66 1.820 0.982 0.988 0.944 0.955 0.964 0.969 0.967 0.886 
Norway 129 3.417 0.980 0.958 0.975 0.940 0.906 0.991 0.958 0.884 
Peru 4 5.433 0.494 0.487 0.371 0.191 0.579 0.282 0.401 0.628 
Philippines 34 0.810 0.505 0.322 0.513 0.212 0.540 0.424 0.419 0.649 
Poland 18 -1.215 0.734 0.657 0.688 0.693 0.727 0.631 0.688 0.777 
Portugal 13 3.224 0.906 0.840 0.814 0.832 0.842 0.837 0.845 0.844 
Russian Fed 23 -3.625 0.226 0.183 0.432 0.228 0.327 0.189 0.264 . 
Singapore 136 2.024 0.479 0.980 0.994 0.899 0.992 0.929 0.879 0.856 
South Africa 76 3.604 0.713 0.685 0.772 0.340 0.648 0.566 0.621 0.679 
South Korea 93 3.583 0.672 0.689 0.844 0.595 0.732 0.751 0.714 0.766 
Spain 87 1.629 0.859 0.864 0.849 0.554 0.865 0.851 0.807 0.799 
Sweden 245 2.485 0.973 0.979 0.975 0.928 0.939 0.973 0.961 0.895 
Switzerland 84 2.693 0.956 0.966 0.989 0.979 0.944 0.990 0.971 0.889 
Thailand 25 1.299 0.506 0.497 0.637 0.372 0.608 0.563 0.530 0.671 
Turkey 2 -8.559 0.416 0.601 0.632 0.211 0.593 0.547 0.500 0.630 
United  
Kingdom 
3207 1.865 0.899 0.954 0.947 0.722 0.976 0.944 0.907 0.861 
United States 8456 0.951 0.900 0.922 0.932 0.750 0.942 0.927 0.896 0.843 
Total 17647 1.306 0.883 0.916 0.927 0.757 0.928 0.917 0.888 0.844 
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Table 4 
CARs by governance and size tercile, quartile, and quintile 
This table contains the mean and median acquirer CAR split by size and World Bank governance tercile, quartile, or quintile. 
The CARs are market-adjusted model acquirer CARs computed over the 11-day window surrounding the acquisition 
announcement.  
  Mean Median N   Mean Median N   Mean Median N 
Assets Tercile 3    Assets Quartile 4    Assets Quintile 5    
Gov Tercile 1 0.756 0.466 2451 Gov Quartile 1 0.633 0.379 1525 Gov Quintile 1 0.497 0.315 1052 
Gov Tercile 2 0.277 0.131 2239 Gov Quartile 2 0.733 0.420 1143 Gov Quintile 2 0.804 0.688 655 
Gov Tercile 3 0.080 0.082 1192 Gov Quartile 3 -0.212 -0.145 866 Gov Quintile 3 -0.536 -0.384 805 
Overall 0.437 0.333 5882 Gov Quartile 4 0.106 0.072 877 Gov Quintile 4 -0.100 -0.161 431 
    Overall 0.388 0.240 4411 Gov Quintile 5 0.200 0.496 584 
         Overall 0.196 0.140 3527 
              
Gov Tercile 1  
- Gov Tercile 3 
0.676** 0.383***  Gov Quartile 1  
- Gov Quartile 4 
0.527* 0.307***  Gov Quintile 1  
- Gov Quintile 5 
0.297** -0.181***  
              
Assets Tercile 2    Assets Quartile 3    Assets Quintile 4    
Gov Tercile 1 1.569 1.139 1985 Gov Quartile 1 1.372 0.862 1230 Gov Quintile 1 1.386 0.733 849 
Gov Tercile 2 1.395 0.853 2563 Gov Quartile 2 1.207 0.816 1255 Gov Quintile 2 1.126 0.810 661 
Gov Tercile 3 0.543 0.445 1334 Gov Quartile 3 1.100 0.514 1026 Gov Quintile 3 0.800 0.550 799 
Overall 1.260 0.908 5882 Gov Quartile 4 -0.003 0.009 898 Gov Quintile 4 0.877 0.329 613 
    Overall 0.982 0.643 4409 Gov Quintile 5 -0.006 -0.048 609 
         Overall 0.876 0.568 3531 
              
Gov Tercile 1  
- Gov Tercile 3 
1.026 0.694  Gov Quartile 1  
- Gov Quartile 4 
1.375 0.853  Gov Quintile 1  
- Gov Quintile 5 
1.392 0.781  
              
Assets Tercile 1    Assets Quartile 2    Assets Quintile 3    
Gov Tercile 1 2.507 1.611 1638 Gov Quartile 1 1.431 1.004 1063 Gov Quintile 1 1.540 0.963 756 
Gov Tercile 2 1.846 1.022 2229 Gov Quartile 2 1.545 1.095 1314 Gov Quintile 2 1.722 1.210 675 
Gov Tercile 3 2.403 2.187 2016 Gov Quartile 3 2.006 1.291 962 Gov Quintile 3 1.162 0.912 840 
Overall 2.221 1.481 5883 Gov Quartile 4 1.262 1.086 1076 Gov Quintile 4 1.485 0.838 650 
    Overall 1.549 1.110 4415 Gov Quintile 5 0.320 0.408 609 
         Overall 1.264 0.928 3530 
              
Gov Tercile 1  
- Gov Tercile 3 
0.104*** -0.576**  Gov Quartile 1  
- Gov Quartile 4 
0.170 -0.082  Gov Quintile 1  
- Gov Quintile 5 
1.221 0.555  
              
     Assets Quartile 1    Assets Quintile 2    
    Gov Quartile 1 2.481 1.352 721 Gov Quintile 1 1.983 1.136 656 
    Gov Quartile 2 2.150 1.337 1332 Gov Quintile 2 2.167 2.010 717 
    Gov Quartile 3 2.292 1.344 854 Gov Quintile 3 0.729 0.271 705 
    Gov Quartile 4 2.366 2.365 1505 Gov Quintile 4 2.578 1.874 717 
    Overall 2.305 1.556 4412 Gov Quintile 5 1.673 1.680 734 
         Overall 1.826 1.339 3529 
              
    Gov Quartile 1  
- Gov Quartile 4 
0.115*** -1.013  Gov Quintile 1  
- Gov Quintile 5 
0.311* -0.543  
              
          Assets Quintile 1    
         Gov Quintile 1 2.248 1.396 435 
         Gov Quintile 2 2.557 1.586 800 
         Gov Quintile 3 2.321 1.415 606 
         Gov Quintile 4 1.975 1.275 712 
         Gov Quintile 5 2.581 2.379 977 
         Overall 2.368 1.575 3530 
              
          Gov Quintile 1  
- Gov Quintile 5 
-0.333** -0.983  
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Table 5: Acquirer announcement returns (CARs) regressions 
The table reports OLS regressions that examine the market’s reaction to the firm’s takeover decision. The dependent variable is the 11-day market-adjusted 
CAR. Detailed variable definitions are reported in appendix 1. The models include year dummies (untabulated). P-values calculated using heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors and corrected for industry-level clustering (using 4-digit SIC industry codes) are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and 
*, denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable 11-day %CAR 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Ln(Assets) 0.059 0.057 0.290*** 0.293***     
 [0.325] [0.340] [0.000] [0.000]     
WB Gov Index 0.142  5.016***      
 [0.914]  [0.003]      
ICRG Political Index  -0.582  3.854*     
  [0.772]  [0.085]     
Ln(Assets)* WB Gov Index   -0.385***      
   [0.000]      
Ln(Assets)* ICRG Political Index    -0.409***     
    [0.000]     
Size top 25%     -1.228***  -1.125***  
     [0.000]  [0.000]  
Size top 10%      -1.373***  -1.277*** 
      [0.000]  [0.000] 
Weak WB Gov x Size top 25%     0.658**    
     [0.016]    
Weak WB Gov x Size top 10%      0.710*   
      [0.066]   
Weak Political Gov x Size top 25%       0.514**  
       [0.034]  
Weak Political Gov x Size top 10%        0.612 
        [0.100] 
Weak WB Gov     -0.375 -0.284   
     [0.115] [0.197]   
Weak Political Gov       0.043 0.103 
       [0.826] [0.569] 
Tobin’s q 0.262*** 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.273*** 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.267*** 0.265*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Relative size 1.156*** 1.155*** 0.872*** 0.868*** 1.045*** 1.085*** 1.047*** 1.089*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Return on assets 0.946 0.881 1.539*** 1.475*** 1.188** 1.117* 1.151* 1.081* 
 [0.112] [0.139] [0.006] [0.009] [0.048] [0.063] [0.058] [0.074] 
Leverage -1.483** -1.532** -0.627 -0.661 -1.066* -1.283** -1.119* -1.336** 
 [0.014] [0.011] [0.289] [0.263] [0.078] [0.034] [0.062] [0.026] 
Cash-holdings -1.073** -1.145** -1.537*** -1.602*** -1.230** -1.122** -1.266** -1.163** 
 [0.033] [0.032] [0.001] [0.002] [0.016] [0.027] [0.013] [0.022] 
CAPEX -4.708*** -4.691*** -4.840*** -4.816*** -5.004*** -4.955*** -4.806*** -4.797*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Diversifying -0.052 -0.047 -0.021 -0.02 -0.032 -0.039 -0.038 -0.045 
 [0.783] [0.806] [0.911] [0.915] [0.866] [0.837] [0.839] [0.810] 
Competed -0.021 0.004 0.208 0.243 0.092 0.082 0.101 0.099 
 [0.976] [0.995] [0.758] [0.722] [0.893] [0.904] [0.882] [0.885] 
Tender 1.025** 0.943* 0.964* 0.882* 1.021** 1.025** 1.031** 1.023** 
 [0.043] [0.069] [0.059] [0.092] [0.046] [0.045] [0.046] [0.047] 
Friendly -0.429 -0.367 -0.537 -0.465 -0.603 -0.539 -0.544 -0.495 
 [0.426] [0.503] [0.323] [0.399] [0.265] [0.317] [0.319] [0.361] 
Cross-border -0.323* -0.28 -0.144 -0.099 -0.231 -0.271 -0.222 -0.259 
 [0.097] [0.147] [0.478] [0.621] [0.238] [0.164] [0.253] [0.178] 
Cash only -0.136 -0.123 -0.075 -0.066 -0.094 -0.117 -0.116 -0.135 
 [0.367] [0.410] [0.611] [0.649] [0.521] [0.433] [0.438] [0.369] 
Stock only -0.664*** -0.648*** -0.601*** -0.581*** -0.624*** -0.641*** -0.648*** -0.662*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.007] [0.009] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
Public target -3.347*** -3.307*** -2.984*** -2.939*** -3.187*** -3.224*** -3.157*** -3.194*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Private target -0.406*** -0.381*** -0.628*** -0.601*** -0.552*** -0.515*** -0.543*** -0.503*** 
 [0.003] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Home market capitalization 2.784 -1.285 1.865 -4.007 2.66 2.51 1.46 1.495 
 [0.902] [0.955] [0.935] [0.862] [0.898] [0.905] [0.946] [0.945] 
Home turnover 0.12 0.129 0.253 0.254 0.322 0.281 0.224 0.189 
 [0.638] [0.606] [0.305] [0.296] [0.194] [0.257] [0.376] [0.453] 
FDI -1.248 -1.343 -1.262 -1.391 -1.103 -1.186 -1.356 -1.424 
 [0.552] [0.530] [0.555] [0.526] [0.597] [0.579] [0.526] [0.515] 
Unemployment -0.03 -0.03 -0.038 -0.041 -0.026 -0.025 -0.036 -0.036 
 [0.498] [0.544] [0.410] [0.407] [0.561] [0.567] [0.420] [0.421] 
Trade imbalance -2.158* -2.508* -1.846 -2.335* -2.257* -2.365* -2.654** -2.800** 
 [0.091] [0.066] [0.150] [0.087] [0.065] [0.051] [0.030] [0.021] 
Constant 1.409 2.042 -2.653 -1.404 2.874*** 2.728*** 2.819*** 2.708*** 
 [0.454] [0.389] [0.221] [0.585] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Observations 17647 17459 17647 17459 17,647 17,647 17,647 17,647 
Adjusted R2 2.90% 2.90% 3.30% 3.30% 3.10% 3.00% 3.10% 3.00% 
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Table 6: Takeover approval (deal completion) regressions 
The table reports OLS regressions that examine the length of time to deal completion. The dependent variable is the number of days to deal completion, 
measured from the deal announcement date to the completion date. Detailed variable definitions are reported in appendix 1. The models include year 
dummies (untabulated). P-values calculated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and corrected for industry-level clustering (using 4-digit SIC 
industry codes) are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Days to completion 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Ln(Assets) 0.604 1.257**     
 [0.348] [0.045]     
WB Gov. Index -206.427***      
 [0.000]      
Ln(Assets)* WB Gov. Index 4.711***      
 [0.000]      
ICRG Political Index  -282.221***     
  [0.000]     
Ln(Assets)* ICRG Political Index  4.495***     
  [0.000]     
Size top 25%   20.977*** 23.958***   
   [0.000] [0.000]   
Size top 10%     36.043*** 37.380*** 
     [0.000] [0.000] 
Weak WB Gov. x Size top 25%   0.287    
   [0.917]    
Weak Political Gov. x Size top 25%    -4.859   
    [0.163]   
Weak WB Gov. x Size top 10%     -11.414**  
     [0.037]  
Weak Political Gov. x Size top 10%      -14.377*** 
      [0.009] 
Weak WB Gov.   12.319***  13.180***  
   [0.000]  [0.000]  
Weak Political Gov.    18.747***  19.013*** 
    [0.000]  [0.000] 
Tobin’s q 0.975** 1.359*** 0.727 1.045** 0.756 1.063** 
 [0.024] [0.004] [0.127] [0.027] [0.113] [0.025] 
Relative size 33.679*** 33.160*** 31.742*** 31.909*** 31.086*** 31.225*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Return on assets -8.506* -7.059 1.436 0.26 2.37 1.216 
 [0.065] [0.111] [0.734] [0.951] [0.570] [0.772] 
Leverage -14.662* -10.793 -5.582 -5.642 -1.035 -0.985 
 [0.051] [0.152] [0.505] [0.477] [0.903] [0.904] 
Cash-holdings -8.723* -9.535* -3.856 -4.353 -5.657 -6.064 
 [0.075] [0.058] [0.434] [0.378] [0.258] [0.226] 
CAPEX -7.16 -8.419 -7.982 -10.871 -7.004 -10.22 
 [0.505] [0.442] [0.452] [0.336] [0.503] [0.356] 
Diversifying -5.797** -6.252** -5.712** -6.159** -5.579** -6.057** 
 [0.025] [0.018] [0.033] [0.023] [0.037] [0.025] 
Competed 39.355*** 41.500*** 41.307*** 41.265*** 40.846*** 40.647*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tender -31.320*** -31.080*** -34.657*** -34.809*** -34.966*** -34.742*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Friendly -28.992*** -31.494*** -37.088*** -35.818*** -37.494*** -36.188*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Cross-border -2.411 -3.381** -4.702*** -4.501*** -4.284*** -4.026*** 
 [0.117] [0.033] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.009] 
Cash only -4.602*** -4.415*** -4.033*** -4.020*** -3.559** -3.557** 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.006] [0.007] [0.012] [0.012] 
Stock only 22.895*** 23.501*** 26.587*** 26.024*** 26.923*** 26.321*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Public target 52.371*** 51.926*** 50.937*** 51.296*** 51.036*** 51.300*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Private target -19.298*** -19.350*** -21.276*** -20.774*** -21.777*** -21.228*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Home market capitalization 1,000.532*** 1,154.772*** 371.691* 631.871*** 346.691 617.369*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.099] [0.006] [0.120] [0.006] 
Home turnover -9.869*** -16.478*** -13.032*** -15.216*** -12.888*** -14.974*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
FDI -13.463 -28.957** -38.708*** -48.655*** -37.900*** -47.633*** 
 [0.243] [0.022] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] 
Unemployment -2.983*** -3.918*** -2.757*** -3.126*** -2.746*** -3.127*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Trade imbalance -64.806*** -70.996*** -98.346*** -106.042*** -90.903*** -100.325*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 217.304*** 277.701*** 102.791*** 101.682*** 103.717*** 102.763*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 17,646 17,458 17,646 17,646 17,646 17,646 
Adjusted R2 25.30% 24.90% 23.10% 23.60% 23.10% 23.70% 
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Table 7: Deal mood regressions 
The table reports logit regressions that examine the mood of the takeover. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the deal is friendly, and 0 otherwise. 
Detailed variable definitions are reported in appendix 1. The models include year dummies (untabulated). P-values calculated using heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors and corrected for industry-level clustering (using 4-digit SIC industry codes) are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and 
*, denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
Dependent Variable Friendly Deal Indicator 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Ln(Assets) 0.094** 0.076*     
 [0.023] [0.066]     
WB Gov. Index 5.871***      
 [0.000]      
Ln(Assets)* WB Gov. Index -0.156***      
 [0.001]      
ICRG Political Index  8.868***     
  [0.000]     
Ln(Assets)* ICRG Political Index  -0.127***     
  [0.009]     
Size top 25%   -1.575*** -1.446***   
   [0.000] [0.000]   
Size top 10%     -1.001*** -1.203*** 
     [0.001] [0.000] 
Weak WB Gov. x Size top 25%   1.406***    
   [0.000]    
Weak Political Gov. x Size top 25%    1.338***   
    [0.000]   
Weak WB Gov. x Size top 10%     0.618*  
     [0.097]  
Weak Political Gov. x Size top 10%      1.046*** 
      [0.004] 
Weak WB Gov.   -1.348***  -0.894***  
   [0.000]  [0.000]  
Weak Political Gov.    -1.102***  -0.793*** 
    [0.000]  [0.000] 
Tobin’s q 0.049 0.033 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.029 
 [0.277] [0.467] [0.556] [0.544] [0.523] [0.516] 
Relative size -0.373*** -0.342*** -0.348*** -0.354*** -0.331*** -0.331*** 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Return on assets 0.371 0.239 0.194 0.208 0.058 0.09 
 [0.365] [0.559] [0.628] [0.602] [0.882] [0.819] 
Leverage 0.166 0.052 0.051 0.114 -0.113 -0.083 
 [0.706] [0.904] [0.909] [0.799] [0.797] [0.850] 
Cash-holdings -0.790* -0.728* -0.932** -0.865* -0.735* -0.695 
 [0.065] [0.092] [0.038] [0.051] [0.097] [0.113] 
CAPEX 1.501* 1.392* 0.986 1.296 1.117 1.368* 
 [0.074] [0.083] [0.229] [0.109] [0.170] [0.092] 
Diversifying -0.049 -0.017 -0.035 -0.02 -0.058 -0.043 
 [0.707] [0.891] [0.780] [0.874] [0.648] [0.738] 
Tender offer -1.606*** -1.574*** -1.562*** -1.528*** -1.561*** -1.540*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Cross-border 0.033 0.025 0.107 0.128 0.078 0.092 
 [0.826] [0.862] [0.466] [0.390] [0.597] [0.543] 
Cash only -0.118 -0.134 -0.08 -0.11 -0.099 -0.126 
 [0.460] [0.400] [0.598] [0.479] [0.518] [0.420] 
Stock only 0.165 0.166 0.146 0.142 0.152 0.137 
 [0.454] [0.457] [0.516] [0.535] [0.495] [0.545] 
Public target -1.009*** -1.049*** -0.957*** -0.927*** -1.005*** -0.967*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Private target -0.804*** -0.777*** -0.740*** -0.752*** -0.701*** -0.710*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Home market capitalization -45.749*** -38.277*** -24.937*** -26.742*** -25.927*** -27.109*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
Home turnover 0.228 0.384* 0.638*** 0.619*** 0.592*** 0.599*** 
 [0.279] [0.069] [0.004] [0.004] [0.009] [0.006] 
FDI -0.954** -0.938** -0.621 -0.6 -0.746 -0.73 
 [0.028] [0.031] [0.133] [0.140] [0.130] [0.154] 
Unemployment 0.145*** 0.187*** 0.165*** 0.174*** 0.167*** 0.171*** 
 [0.003] [0.000] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Trade imbalance 5.317*** 6.168*** 6.164*** 5.893*** 6.354*** 5.954*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.772 -2.123 6.230*** 5.870*** 5.807*** 5.588*** 
 [0.467] [0.104] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 17,647 17,459 17,647 17,647 17,647 17,647 
Pseudo R2 18.27% 17.69% 18.40% 17.99% 17.28% 17.15% 
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Table 8: Takeover premium regressions 
The table reports OLS regressions that examine the determinants of takeover premiums. The dependent variable is the target’s takeover 
premium, calculated as [Transaction value/Target Market Value (t) – 1 ] where we calculate the target’s market value one week or four 
weeks before the acquisition (as denoted in the column headers). The key independent variables are Ln(Assets), the Governance 
Variables, and the interaction term ‘Ln(Assets) x Governance.’ The governance variables are the World Bank (WB) governance variables 
(columns 1 and 4), the ICRG composite index (columns 2 and 5), and the ICRG political index (columns 3 and 6). For all governance 
variables, a higher value indicates better governance. Detailed variable definitions are reported in appendix 1. The models include year 
dummies (untabulated). P-values calculated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and corrected for industry-level 
clustering (using 4-digit SIC industry codes) are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Premium (1 Week) Premium (4 Weeks) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Ln(Assets) -0.356 -0.091 -0.219 -1.305 -1.008 -1.187 
 [0.747] [0.931] [0.843] [0.246] [0.352] [0.285] 
WB Gov. Index 9.511   -5.907   
 [0.627]   [0.765]   
Ln(Assets)* WB Gov. Index -1.481**   -1.405**   
 [0.018]   [0.041]   
ICRG Composite Index  10.333   -27.342  
  [0.824]   [0.575]  
Ln(Assets)* ICRG Composite Index -1.547**   -1.376*  
  [0.024]   [0.070]  
ICRG Political Index   8.319   -12.278 
   [0.789]   [0.702] 
Ln(Assets)* ICRG Political Index  -1.488**   -1.309* 
   [0.024]   [0.076] 
Tobin’s q 0.283 0.258 0.266 1.348** 1.346** 1.373** 
 [0.526] [0.569] [0.559] [0.017] [0.018] [0.015] 
Relative size -4.089** -4.185** -4.189** -4.141 -4.262* -4.17 
 [0.040] [0.035] [0.037] [0.102] [0.091] [0.101] 
Return on assets -10.499 -11.045 -10.987 -2.097 -2.595 -2.554 
 [0.324] [0.306] [0.309] [0.839] [0.803] [0.807] 
Leverage 3.926 4.899 4.895 6.982 7.569 7.478 
 [0.594] [0.515] [0.514] [0.399] [0.369] [0.374] 
Cash-holdings 16.098** 15.935** 15.855** 13.272* 13.133* 12.985* 
 [0.019] [0.026] [0.026] [0.075] [0.084] [0.088] 
CAPEX -14.563 -14.727 -14.582 -34.163** -33.601** -33.608** 
 [0.381] [0.383] [0.384] [0.026] [0.030] [0.029] 
Diversifying 1.32 1.303 1.31 0.509 0.329 0.353 
 [0.519] [0.536] [0.533] [0.833] [0.893] [0.885] 
Competed 16.715*** 17.212*** 17.255*** 18.328*** 18.748*** 18.844*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tender 2.059 2.211 2.241 2.093 2.2 2.311 
 [0.260] [0.246] [0.243] [0.310] [0.297] [0.276] 
Friendly -8.942** -8.107** -8.204** -3.219 -2.301 -2.423 
 [0.023] [0.040] [0.038] [0.431] [0.574] [0.556] 
Cross-border 6.357*** 6.539*** 6.544*** 8.508*** 8.285*** 8.398*** 
 [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Cash only 8.336*** 8.267*** 8.243*** 9.658*** 9.610*** 9.594*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Stock only -1.799 -1.599 -1.642 0.832 0.95 0.899 
 [0.466] [0.525] [0.513] [0.753] [0.721] [0.735] 
Home market capitalization 466.193 451.195 459.146 587.335* 611.757* 594.154* 
 [0.142] [0.177] [0.163] [0.085] [0.092] [0.090] 
Home turnover 0.233 -0.193 -0.313 4.57 4.366 3.859 
 [0.943] [0.955] [0.928] [0.249] [0.298] [0.358] 
FDI 8.462 8.563 8.484 3.216 3.514 3.363 
 [0.652] [0.648] [0.649] [0.853] [0.841] [0.846] 
Unemployment -0.37 -0.354 -0.4 -0.661 -0.729 -0.713 
 [0.414] [0.505] [0.417] [0.125] [0.161] [0.146] 
Trade imbalance 19.07 19.668 21.264 -1.232 -10.115 1.426 
 [0.204] [0.362] [0.167] [0.944] [0.686] [0.937] 
Constant 55.156* 49.354 53.254 81.970*** 92.112** 83.014** 
 [0.060] [0.250] [0.154] [0.006] [0.040] [0.035] 
Observations 1,889 1,865 1,865 1,895 1,871 1,871 
Adjusted R2 9.40% 9.40% 9.40% 10.10% 10.00% 10.00% 
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Table 9: Domestic and diversifying deals (CARs) 
The table reports OLS regressions that examine the market’s reaction to the firm’s takeover decision for sub-samples of domestic deals and diversifying deals. 
The panel header states the size-variable under analysis. The dependent variable is the 11-day market-adjusted CAR. The models contain all control variables 
as in Table 5, which are suppressed for brevity. Detailed variable definitions are reported in appendix 1. The models include year dummies (untabulated). P-
values calculated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and corrected for industry-level clustering (using 4-digit SIC industry codes) are 
reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Sample Domestic Diversifying 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Panel A: Continuous size variable     
Ln(Assets) 0.224*** 0.209** 0.290*** 0.303*** 
 [0.007] [0.012] [0.003] [0.001] 
WB Gov. Index 4.894***  5.353***  
 [0.005]  [0.004]  
Ln(Assets)* WB Gov. Index -0.419***  -0.406***  
 [0.000]  [0.000]  
ICRG Political Index  3.16  5.387** 
  [0.221]  [0.027] 
Ln(Assets)* ICRG Political Index  -0.423***  -0.429*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,085 13,023 11,853 11,727 
Adjusted R2 3.90% 3.90% 3.10% 3.10% 
Panel B: Size top 10%     
Size top 10% -1.433*** -1.203*** -1.400*** -1.323*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Bad WB Gov. -0.38  -0.352  
 [0.152]  [0.134]  
Bad WB Gov. x Size top 10% 0.921**  0.678  
 [0.013]  [0.145]  
Bad Political Gov.   0.119  0.023 
  [0.575]  [0.904] 
Bad Political Gov. x Size top 10%  0.642*  0.609 
  [0.072]  [0.177] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,085 13,085 11,853 11,853 
R-squared 3.60% 3.60% 2.80% 2.80% 
Panel C: Size top 25%     
Size top 25% -1.490*** -1.359*** -1.295*** -1.236*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Bad WB Gov. -0.467*  -0.449*  
 [0.086]  [0.085]  
Bad WB Gov. x Size top 25% 0.856***  0.677**  
 [0.004]  [0.047]  
Bad Political Gov.   0.037  -0.059 
  [0.869]  [0.783] 
Bad Political Gov. x Size top 25%  0.686***  0.611** 
  [0.005]  [0.040] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,085 13,085 11,853 11,853 
R-squared 3.80% 3.90% 2.90% 2.80% 
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Table 10: Examining the importance of connections 
The table reports OLS regressions that examine the importance of corporate size in countries where political connections are particularly important. The 
dependent variable is the 11-day market-adjusted CAR. The key independent variables are Ln(Assets). Detailed variable definitions are reported in appendix 
1. The models include year dummies (untabulated). P-values calculated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and corrected for industry-level 
clustering (using 4-digit SIC industry codes) are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Ln(Assets) 0.035 -0.032 -0.026 
 [0.622] [0.687] [0.762] 
% Firms with MP/HOS or relative thereof -1.575***   
 [0.002]   
Ln(Assets)* % Firms with MP/HOS or relative thereof 0.080***   
 [0.002]   
% Firms with MP/HOS  -3.352***  
  [0.001]  
Ln(Assets)* % Firms with MP/HOS  0.167***  
  [0.002]  
% Top 50 Firms with MP/HOS or relative thereof   -0.961*** 
   [0.000] 
Ln(Assets)* % Top 50 Firms with MP/HOS or relative thereof   0.049*** 
   [0.001] 
Tobin’s q 0.275*** 0.273*** 0.271*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Relative size 1.452*** 1.447*** 1.441*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Return on assets 0.311 0.328 0.261 
 [0.646] [0.630] [0.696] 
Leverage -1.405** -1.442** -1.381** 
 [0.041] [0.035] [0.044] 
Cash-holdings -1.055** -1.044** -1.036** 
 [0.038] [0.039] [0.040] 
CAPEX -4.604*** -4.506*** -4.752*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Diversifying 0.007 0.001 0.008 
 [0.975] [0.995] [0.971] 
Competed -0.074 -0.079 -0.089 
 [0.918] [0.912] [0.901] 
Tender 1.124** 1.131** 1.066* 
 [0.049] [0.047] [0.065] 
Friendly -1.186** -1.157** -1.216** 
 [0.029] [0.032] [0.027] 
Cross-border -0.433* -0.387* -0.478** 
 [0.062] [0.088] [0.043] 
Cash only -0.243 -0.259 -0.208 
 [0.218] [0.186] [0.290] 
Stock only -0.715*** -0.726*** -0.689*** 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Public target -3.440*** -3.425*** -3.448*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Private target -0.432*** -0.428*** -0.441*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
Home market capitalization -1.656 -7.681 2.464 
 [0.940] [0.731] [0.910] 
Home turnover -0.071 -0.11 0.184 
 [0.831] [0.738] [0.555] 
FDI -0.629 0.416 -1.058 
 [0.771] [0.847] [0.634] 
Unemployment -0.025 -0.014 -0.038 
 [0.572] [0.761] [0.406] 
Trade imbalance -1.537 -2.053 -0.352 
 [0.251] [0.121] [0.789] 
Constant 2.777 4.010** 4.133** 
 [0.105] [0.028] [0.039] 
Observations 14,340 14,340 14,340 
Adjusted R2 3.40% 3.40% 3.50% 
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Table 11: Examining post-takeover operating performance 
This table contains regressions that examine post-takeover improvements in operating performance. The dependent variable is an 
indicator that equals one if the acquirer’s EBIT/Assets one year (Columns 1-2), two years (Columns 3-4), or three years (Columns 5-
6) after the acquisition exceeds its EBIT/Assets one year before the acquisitions. Detailed variable definitions are reported in appendix 
1. The models include year dummies (untabulated). P-values calculated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
corrected for industry-level clustering (using 4-digit SIC industry codes) are reported in parentheses. Superscripts ***, **, and *, 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable One Year Increase Two Year Increase Three Year Increase 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Ln(Assets) 0.005 0.014 0.009 0.013 0.03 0.026 
 [0.781] [0.426] [0.556] [0.405] [0.129] [0.160] 
WB Gov. Index 1.025***  0.391  0.165  
 [0.007]  [0.283]  [0.703]  
Ln(Assets)* WB Gov. Index -0.087***  -0.049***  -0.050***  
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.004]  
ICRG Political Index  1.874***  0.443  -0.835 
  [0.001]  [0.394]  [0.109] 
Ln(Assets)* ICRG Political Index  -0.089***  -0.053***  -0.057*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.002] 
Tobin’s q 0.011 0.011 0.043** 0.044** 0.014 0.015 
 [0.635] [0.632] [0.029] [0.026] [0.441] [0.408] 
Relative size 0.049 0.054 0.058 0.057 0.155*** 0.151*** 
 [0.337] [0.295] [0.254] [0.271] [0.001] [0.001] 
Return on assets 2.747*** 2.738*** 0.375*** 0.376*** -0.219 -0.211 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.008] [0.134] [0.147] 
Leverage -0.355 -0.35 0.039 0.047 0.117 0.14 
 [0.152] [0.155] [0.878] [0.852] [0.539] [0.463] 
Cash-holdings 0.904*** 0.911*** 0.292** 0.282** 0.541*** 0.530*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.030] [0.037] [0.000] [0.000] 
CAPEX -0.123 -0.133 -0.436 -0.447 -0.064 -0.067 
 [0.647] [0.619] [0.137] [0.125] [0.864] [0.858] 
Diversifying 0.101** 0.103** -0.028 -0.03 -0.055 -0.062 
 [0.030] [0.027] [0.609] [0.586] [0.375] [0.320] 
Competed 0.328 0.321 0.07 0.057 0.231 0.211 
 [0.133] [0.143] [0.741] [0.788] [0.260] [0.305] 
Tender 0.077 0.057 -0.095 -0.119 -0.077 -0.078 
 [0.476] [0.607] [0.328] [0.226] [0.465] [0.452] 
Friendly -0.096 -0.105 -0.086 -0.083 -0.025 -0.028 
 [0.508] [0.471] [0.571] [0.579] [0.880] [0.868] 
Cross-border -0.104** -0.110** -0.126** -0.126** -0.155*** -0.152*** 
 [0.030] [0.022] [0.016] [0.016] [0.009] [0.010] 
Cash only -0.081** -0.079* 0.015 0.015 -0.095** -0.095** 
 [0.048] [0.054] [0.692] [0.702] [0.017] [0.019] 
Stock only 0.162*** 0.166*** -0.01 -0.009 -0.136** -0.136** 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.872] [0.886] [0.048] [0.049] 
Public target -0.243*** -0.252*** -0.219*** -0.213*** -0.106 -0.094 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.154] [0.200] 
Private target -0.087* -0.091* -0.088** -0.091** -0.079 -0.079 
 [0.064] [0.052] [0.033] [0.029] [0.106] [0.108] 
Home market capitalization -9.143 -10.819* -7.031 -7.318 -5.559 -4.151 
 [0.152] [0.085] [0.232] [0.205] [0.336] [0.473] 
Home turnover 0.111 0.101 0.068 0.05 0.056 0.031 
 [0.133] [0.159] [0.337] [0.473] [0.445] [0.664] 
FDI -0.234 -0.105 0.562 0.534 0.044 -0.139 
 [0.762] [0.894] [0.422] [0.454] [0.946] [0.835] 
Unemployment 0.008 0.013 -0.007 -0.008 -0.029** -0.038** 
 [0.530] [0.313] [0.554] [0.536] [0.046] [0.011] 
Trade imbalance -1.063*** -0.852** -1.148*** -1.106*** -1.493*** -1.658*** 
 [0.008] [0.037] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant -0.354 -1.234* -0.142 -0.202 -0.424 0.609 
 [0.505] [0.072] [0.777] [0.753] [0.491] [0.350] 
Observations 15,049 15,001 15,048 15,000 15,047 14,999 
Pseudo R-squared 4.96% 4.95% 3.45% 3.43% 3.48% 3.51% 
 
